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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) and (4) and
Section 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

DID PLAINTIFF MARSHAL ALL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE FINDINGS?
Standard of Review With Supporting Authority. [FJailure to marshal the evidence and

demonstrate that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous in light of the evidence
allows us to affirm the court's findings on that basis alone." Wilson v. Fradan Mfg., 54 P.3d
1177, 1184 (Utah 2002)(citation omitted)
II.

DID PLAINTIFF PROVE THAT, EVEN WHEN ALL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING
THE FINDINGS HAS BEEN MARSHALED AND IS VIEWED IN THE LIGHT
MOST FAVORABLE TO DEFENDANT, THE FINDINGS WERE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS?
Standard of Review with Supporting Authority. "We apply a deferential standard of

review to the district court's findings of fact, repudiating them only if they are clearly
erroneous." Utah Dept. of Transp. V. G. Kav. Inc.. 78 P.3d 612 (Utah 2003), Rule 52(a),
Ut.R.Civ.P. The verdict of a jury must stand unless "the evidence so clearly preponderates
in favor of the appellant that reasonable people would not differ on the outcome of the case."
E.A. Strout Western Realty v. W.C. Fov & Sons. 665 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1983).
in.

WAS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO "PERMANENT
IMPAIRMENT BASED UPON OBJECTIVE FINDINGS" CAUSED BY THE
AUTO ACCIDENT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS?
Standard of Review With Supporting Authority. "We apply a deferential standard
1

of review to the district court's findings of fact, repudiating them only if they are clearly
erroneous." Utah Dept. of Transp. V. G. Kav. Inc.. 78 P.3d 612 (Utah 2003), Rule 52(a),
Ut.R.Civ.P.
IV.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
PLAINTIFF' S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON PLAINTIFF' S CLAIM
OF INADEQUATE DAMAGES?
Standard of Review With Supporting Authority. The correct standard of review for

a trial court's denial of a motion for new trial based on inadequate general and special
damages under Rule 59(a) is abuse of discretion. Smith v. Fairfax Realty. Inc.. 82 P.3d
1064, 1070 (Utah 2003).
V.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN REFUSING PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 11, 15 and 16?
Standard of Review With Supporting Authority. "A trial court's ruling concerning

jury instruction is reviewed for correctness." Paulos v. Covenant Transport. Inc.. 86 P.3d
752, 754 (Utah App. 2004) (citations omitted). "A new trial will not be granted unless any
error of the trial court was prejudicial, meaning that it misadvised or misled the jury on the
law." Id. "Prejudicial error" is only found after the record demonstrates that "there was a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the [appellant]." In re C.Y. v. Yates.
765 P.2d 251, 254 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (citations omitted). "A reasonable likelihood is 'a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" Limitations omitted).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
2

This was a personal injury case resulting from an auto accident. Plaintiff sustained
a temporary, minor exacerbation of a pre-existing and symptomatic condition and underwent
a short three month course of treatment for her accident related injuries.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The case was tried to a jury on January 7 and 8, 2004. The jury returned a verdict
awarding Plaintiff $2,100 in past special damages, no future special damages, and $2,200
in general damages. Defendant made a motion for a directed verdict because Plaintiff had
not met the threshold requirements of Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(l)(a). The Court
granted Defendant's motion and entered a Judgment of No Cause of Action.
Plaintiff then filed a motion for a new trial arguing that the jury's damage awards
were inadequate, and that the trial court erred in refusing Plaintiffs jury instructions nos.
11,15, and 16. At the hearing on the Motion for a New Trial, Plaintiffs counsel raised, for
the first time, Rule 49(a) of the Ut.R.Civ.P. She suggested that the trial court enter a finding
of fact that Plaintiff had a "permanent impairment based upon obj ective finding." The Court
made factual findings, one of which was that Plaintiff did not have a "permanent impairment
based on objective finding" caused this auto accident.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
PRE-MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INJURIES AND TREATMENT
1.

In the 8 to 9 months prior to the motor vehicle accident, Plaintiff was involved

in two work related incidents in which she injured her back. (R. 363 at 63:3, 65:5-10,71:7-

3

13, R. Pi's Ex. 1, p.l, 6, R. Def.'s Ex. E).
2.

The first work related injury occurred on January 30, 1998. (R. 363 at 63:3,

65:5-10, R. Pi's Ex. 1, p. 1, R. Def.'s Ex. E).
3.

Plaintiff worked as a home health aid. She was responsible for transferring

patients from beds to wheelchairs, from wheelchairs to toilets, etc. (R. 363 at 60:24,61:4-17)
4.

She first injured her back transferring a patient from a bathtub to her toilet.

The patient fell and pulled Plaintiffto the ground. (R. 363 at 65:5-10,14-16, Def.'s Ex. E).
5.

Following the first injury, she treated with her physician, Dr. Travis Buzzard.

(R. 363 at 66:15, 17; R. Def.'s Ex. E)
6.

She treated with Dr. Buzzard on 2/2/98,2/9/98,2/23/98,3/9/98,4/20/98, and

5/11/98. Dr. Buzzard treated her for left sided low back strain and for left shoulder pain.
(R. Def.'s Ex. A, R. Def.'s Ex. E).
7.

She was on "light duty" status (i.e. working in an office with lifting

restrictions) from January, 1998 until auto accident.(R. 363 at 69:24-25, 70:3-4,18, 22-23,
25,71:2,4)
8.

On 4/20/98 Dr. Buzzard noted that she was lifting files in the office and

injured her left shoulder. (R. Def.'s Ex. A, p. 6).
9.

Dr. Buzzard prescribed various medications for her up to his last treatment on

5/11/98. Dr. Buzzard referred her to physical therapy ("P.T.") (R. Def.'s Ex. A, p. 1-7; R.
Def. Ex. D; R. Def.'s Ex. E; R. 363 at 158:1-2).
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10.

On5/20/98 she first saw Dr. David Petron because ofthe January, 1998 injury.

She treated with him on 5/20/98,6/3/98,6/24/98,7/8/98,8/24/98, and 9/10/98. (R. PL's Ex.
A, pp. 1-7).
11.

Dr. Petron administered trigger point inj ections into her thoracolumbar region.

He administered an injection 8 days before the auto accident, 9/10/98. (R. 363 at 67:20; R.
PL's Ex. 1, pp. 2, 4, 5, 7).
12.

On 5/20/98, Dr. Petron ordered additional physical therapy and continued

light duty status. (R.363 at 68-69, R. PL's Ex. 1, p.l).
13.

On 7/8/98 Dr. Petron described Plaintiffs condition as "Thoracolumbar and

thoracic myofascial back pain..." (R. PL's Ex. 1, p. 4).
14.

It appeared as if Plaintiff was improving with her condition when on August

14, 1998 she re-injured her back a 2nd time at work. She was transferring a quadriplegic
patient from a wheelchair to a bed. She injured the same area of her back. (R. PL's Ex. 1,
p. 6; R. 363 at 69:6; 71:7, 24-25; 72:2-25; 73:1-16).
14.

After the second work injury, Dr. Petron ordered light duty status and more

P.T.(R. Def.'s Ex. B, p. 17, R. Def.'s Ex. E; R. 363 at 73:18-19; R. PL's Ex. 1, p. 6).
15.

On 8/27/98 her therapist reported that she had "slight improvement". (R.

Def.'s Ex. D,p. 27).
16.

On 9/1/98 the physical therapist stated that she complained of tenderness. (R.

Def.'s Ex. D, p. 27).
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17.

On 9/1/98 Dr. Petron prescribed more P.T. (R.363 at 170:15; R. Def.'s Ex.

D, p. 2).
18.

On 9/3/98 her "upper back still bother[ed] her". She planned to see Dr. Petron

the next week for more trigger point injections. (R. Def/s Ex. D, P. 28)
19.

At trial, the jury was presented with evidence that Plaintiff had as many as 43

physical therapy visits in the 8 to 9 months prior to the motor vehicle accident. (R. Def.'s
Ex. C5 p.l; Def.'s Ex. D, pp. 19-28; R. Def.'s Ex. E).
20.

On 9/2/98 Plaintiff filled a prescription for a muscle relaxant (Flexeril). (R.

Def.'s Ex. D, last page; R. 363 at 171; 364 at 202:1-5).
21.

On 9/14/98 she filled a prescription for a narcotic pain medication (Lortab).

(R. Def.'s Ex. D, last page; R. 363 at 92:20).
22.

When asked if she recalled refilling a prescription for Lortab on 9/14/98 her

response was "I could have". (R. 363 at 92:23).
23.

She testified she would refill Lortab if she was having pain. (R. 363 at 93:4).

29.

When asked if she recalled filling a prescription for Flexeril on 9/2/9 8 Plaintiff

stated that "I don't remember, I could have." (R. 363 at 92:20; 93:3).
24.

On 9/10/98 Plaintiff had back pain, Dr. Petron noted she was "becoming quite

dependent on physical therapy." She had "trigger points" and was "quite tender to touch."
She requested and received trigger point injections. (R.363 at 168-169; R. PL's Ex. 1, p. 7).
25.

Dr. Petron testified that trigger point injections serve a dual purpose of

6

breaking up spasm and alleviating pain. (R.363 at 166:1-4).
TREATMENT FROM MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT THROUGH 12/17/98
26.

She treated with Dr. Petron 5 times between 9/22/98 and 12/17/98. (R. PL's

Ex. 1, pp. 8-11, R. Def.'s Ex. E).
27.

Between 9/23/98 and 11/24/98 she had 17 therapy visits. (R. PL's Ex. 12, p. 1;

R. Def.'s Ex. E).
28.

Plaintiff reported continual improvement in symptoms in the months

immediately after the auto accident. (R. PL's Ex. 1, p. 10).
29.

By 11/24/98 she reported "overall she [felt] as if things are slowly improving."

She wished to get back into the field. She had full "ROM" in her neck and shoulders. (R.
Pi's Ex. l,p. 11).
30.

On 12/17/98 she reported her "neck pain is improved", she was "able to return

to her usual work capacity". She was told to return as needed. (R. PL's Ex. 1, p. 11).
31.

The total charges for Dr. Petron's treatment (i.e. $680.00), the 17 physical

therapy treatment between the date of the motor vehicle accident and 12/17/98 (i.e.
$1,252,00), and pharmacy charge on 10/12/98 (i.e. $143.00) totaled $2,075.00. (R. Pi's
Ex.4, pp 6-12, PL's Ex. 6, pp. 1-2, PL's Ex. 9, last page).
TREATMENT AFTER DECEMBER 17. 1998
32.

From 12/17/9 8 through 4/14/99 Ms. Marshall had no medical care. (R.Def.'s

Ex. E; R. PL's Ex. l,pp. 11-12; R.363 164:12).
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33.

On 5/25/99 she reported to Dr. Petron that she "had a re-injury of her neck and

back one and a half weeks ago." (R. PL's Ex. 1, p. 12; R. Def.'s Ex. E).
Regarding this 3rd work injury, Mr. Marshall testified: "I don't remember

34.

injuring it. . ." (R. PL's Ex. R. 363 at 90:17-18).
35.

In 1999, she had no other treatment after 5/25/99. (R. PL's Ex. 9, p. 1-2; R.

Def.'s Ex. E).
36.

Her next treatment with Dr. Petron was on 3/2/00. She then saw him on

5/17/00,10/9/00, and 11/9/00. She had no treatment with any provider in 2001 or 2002. (R.
PL's Ex. 1, pp. 17-17, PL's Ex. 2, PL's Ex. 12, PL's Ex. 13).
37.

On 10/22/01 Dr. Petron stated Ms. Marshall "has not sustained any permanent

disability as far as loss of range of motion or any objective impairment or disfigurement that
we can see on MRI or x-ray. . ." (R. Pi's Ex. 2, last page).
DR. JEFFREY CHUNG'S EXPERT TESTIMONY SUPPORTING THE VERDICT
38.

It was the defense's theory that when a plaintiff has a symptomatic, pre-

existing condition and is injured in an auto accident, the defendant is only liable for the
exacerbation of those injuries. (R. 363 at 50:25; 51:1-4; 364 at 287:19-25).
39.

Dr. Jeffrey Chung prepared a pre-trial expert report. (R. Def.'s Ex. C).

40.

Dr. Chung stated:

Ms. Marshall's complaints of pain and discomfort since 1/30/98 to the present
have been purely subjective. There have never been objective findings of
injuries in any of the patient's medical records that I reviewed today." (R.
Def.'s Ex. C, p. 10).
8

41.

Dr. Chung stated:

Ms. Marshall most likely achieved medical stability following the accident of
9/18/98 on 12/17/98. I believe she reached medical stability on 12/17/98,
because the patient did not seek medical treatment with Dr. Petron for close
to four months between 12/17/98 and 4/14/99." (R. Def.'s Ex. C, p. 13).
42.

Dr. Chung stated:

Given the chronicity of symptoms noted in the medical records prior to the
motor vehicle accident of 9-18-98, I believe it is likely that even if the
accident of 9-18-98 had never occurred the patient would still have sufficient
subjective symptoms involving her lumbosacral region . . . I believe it would
be reasonable to assign the responsibility of the patient's current subjective
symptoms of pain and discomfort which cause her to voluntarily restrict her
physical activities equally between the accidents of 1-30-98, August 1998 and
9-18-98. (R. Def.'s Ex. C, p. 14).
43.

Dr. Chung testified it was not likely that Plaintiff was "asymptomatic" prior

to the auto accident. (R. 364 at 230:21-25; 231:1-22).
44.

Dr. Chung, without objection, testified:

My opinion is this. Ms. Marshall was fragile. She had pre-existing
myofascial tender points and trigger points effecting her spine from her
shoulders down to her low back, starting in January, 1998 and still requiring
treatment through September of 1998. This car accident did not help things.
It flared it up - flared up her symptoms. Looking through the medical records
where she received treatment, it appears that the treatment she received from
September 22 of 1998 extending through December 17, 1998 was directly
related to the car accident... You know, she just had a flare up of symptoms
when she saw him. In May of 1999 she had a flare up because of the type of
work she does. So even if this car accident never happened, given that she's
had nine months of symptoms from January of 1998 to September of 1998,1
think most physicians would have expected her to have periodic flare ups and
intermediate treatment regardless of this car accident. (R. 364 at 233:23-25;
234 1-7; 235 1-7).
45.

Dr. Chung, without objection, testified:
9

A: And that it [the auto accident] probably flared up symptoms and required
treatment. Now there's two ways of looking at the glass that's half full, you
look at it as half empty or half full. You can look at this car accident as being
something that flared up something temporarily and went back to baseline, or
you could say there's four accident. Okay, three of those accidents appeared
about equal. The accident of January 30th, 1998, the accident at work in
August of 1998, the motor vehicle accident in September of 1998, and those
seem - those accidents all required about the same amount of treatments and
seemed to be about as intense. The last accident of May 1999 seemed to be
least intense and required the least amount of treatment. So if you look at just
the number of injuries, you could say, alright, let's apportion 30 percent of the
first accident, 30 percent in the second accident, and 30 percent in the third
accident, and 10 percent to the last accident, because there's four accidents,
of which the last accident is the last significant. If you look at that, I think
that's a reasonable way to look at it. Of you could look at this motor vehicle
accident as one in a series of flare ups. Okay, that really didn't change
anything long-term. Okay?
(R. 364 at 235:12-25; 236:1-19).
46.

Plaintiff did not object to any of Dr. Chung's opinions. (R. 364 at 219-246).

47.

Dr. Chung testified, without objection, that he did not think that future medical

care would be necessary because of this auto accident. (R. at 239:10-21).
48.

Dr. Chung testified that Ms. Marshall reached Maximum Medical

Improvement (MMI) in relation to the auto accident on 12/17/1998. (R. 364 at 241:4-20).
49.

Dr. Chung testified, without objection:

[s]ubjective means that it's a complaint that can be influenced by a patient
consciously. Okay, an objective finding is something that cannot be
influenced by a patient. Ms. Marshall's complaints are entirely subjective.
That doesn't mean they - they don't exist, but it can't be conformed [sic] or
proved by a test, like an x-ray or MRI scan." (R. 364 at 245:11-17).
50.

Dr. Chung testified, without objection:

Q: I just want to be clear here. There, according to your review of these
10

medical records, there was nothing objective go [sic] demonstrate that she in
fact was injured. You don't dispute that she was.
A: Right. Right, you know, there are a lot of diseases like myofascial pain
syndrome that cannot be objectified. You can't do a test that shows it exists
or not. I see no reason not to believe Ms. Marshall when she says she hurts,
or that these areas are tender, or, you know, that she saw the doctors that she
saw and said what she said. But you have to also understand that objective
things help because it takes away any uncertainty. A broken bone is a broken
bone is a broken bone, and it shows up on an x-ray. Now, there are some
things that you can see on x-ray that are subjective findings. For example,
loss of cervical lordosis means that the neck is straight. Okay, right now I've
lost the cervical lordosis, and we saw that on x-ray, but radiologists say loss
of cervical lordosis. Well, obviously the position of your neck is something
that you can control. That's a subjective finding. A broken bone, a torn
ligament, or gap in your bones that cannot be consciously influenced is an
objective finding. (R. 364 at 245:18-25; 246:1-14).
51.

Dr. Chung testified on cross examination as follows:

. . . I don't think that you could say that if it wasn't for this accident that Ms.
Marshall would've been completely cured. I believe you could say that Ms.
Marshall does work that strenuous, okay Q: You're trying to convince the jury that she would've been essentially the
same today if there hadn't been a motor vehicle accident?
A: Yes, I think I've made it clear - (R. 364 at 252:4-11).
52.

Dr. Chung testified on cross examination as follows:

Q: When you touch a patient and she jumps, is that an objective or subjective
finding?
A: Subjective.
Q: Even though you're observing that reaction.
A: Right. Subjective doesn't mean it's fake. Subjective means that it's under
the conscious influence of a patient. So if a good actor can mimic the
symptoms or complaints, that's subjective.
Q: If they're in a muscle spasm that you can observe and relaxing that
occurred when you treated it, is that a subjective or objective.
A: Well, I can clench my muscle, and I can relax it. So it's the same. Was it
conscious? It's possible for a person to consciously contract and relax a
muscle, that a subjective finding.
11

Q: So the answer is subjective.
A: Yes.
Q: Is it true that there are many objective findings that a doctor - treating
doctor makes that are in part involving either the statements or movement or
an action of a person which nonetheless he observed apart from specific
photographs? Provable scientific tests?
A: I think you're confusing the terms subjective and objective. There are
numerous subjective pains that a physician looks at, observes, and uses as part
of his diagnostic criteria, and there - there are a lot of diagnoses like
myofascial pain syndrome and muscle strains that are based entirely on
subjective symptoms, and they exist. Okay? So I don't want there to be any
confusion that subjective is not real. Okay, but there's a difference. (R. 364
at 258:4-25; 259:1-8).
DR. PETRON'S TESTIMONY SUPPORTING THE VERDICT
53.

Dr. Petron was asked whether Ms. Marshall was showing improvement as of

her 9/10/98 date. He responded:
Q: So would this suggest that she is recovering or retrograding, or what would
you say?
A: I couldn't make any conclusion by the number of trigger point injections
that I did.
Q: But the rest of the report, does that suggest that she - suggesting, among
other things that she return to work, which I'm taking - I'm concluding would
mean she's improving.
A: I don't know if she's improving, because she - she was on light duty, and
I continued her on light duty, but wanted to advance her to full duty shortly.
(R. 363 at 149:15-25, emphasis added)
54.

Dr. Petron testified that by 12/17/98 her neck "was improved. She felt that she

was able to return to her usual work capacity . . ." (R. 363 at 152:6-10).
55.

On direct examination, Dr. Petron was asked:

Q: Now if, in fact, she had not had that injury - that motor vehicle accident,
what would your opinion have been as to her full recovery?
A: I don't know if she would have fully recovered, but it sounded like she
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was doing well up until - up until she had the motor vehicle accident. (R. 363
at 159:11-16, emphasis added).
56.

On direct examination, Dr. Petron testified:

Q: For the rest of your treatment? And would those pains be consistent with
the kind of a motor vehicle accident that she described to you that happened
on the 19th of September, 1998?
A: I didn't really describe the motor vehicle accident in my notes, so I can't
really say if the symptoms are consistent with the motor vehicle accident but
a motor vehicle accident could cause some of these symptoms. (R. 363 at
159:22-25; 160:1-4, emphasis added).
57.

On cross examination, Dr. Petron testified:

Q: Okay, but - let me go back to my original question. There's nothing in this
record [i.e. the 9/10/98 treatment record] to suggest that, in fact, you released
her to go back to work two days before that accident, is there?
A: No, there isn't. (R. 363 at 168:18-22)
58.

On cross examination, Dr. Petron testified that Plaintiff was reporting

pain in the 9/10/98 visit. He testified:
Q: Okay, now also in this record under objective, it states that she has several
trigger point points along the left periscapular region. Next sentence, she is
quite tender to touch, do you see that?
A: Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q: This would - this seems to suggest to me that she has pain during this visit
with you. Does it not?
A: Yes. (R. 363 at 169:1-8).
59.

On cross examination, Dr. Petron testified:

Q: . . . Doctor, let me just ask you a couple of additional questions. The
question was asked, but for the accident of September of 1998, would she
have gotten better. And I sensed that you were somewhat hesitant to answer
that question.
A: It's always had to speculate if someone would be better. It seemed like
she was getting better, that in August she was a hundred percent better and
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then had a re-exacerbation, and then on 9/10 she was still having some pain
but was improving. And so typically when somebody has myofascial pain
when there's - when there's not underlying problems, they tend to get better.
Q: Okay. And you can't say, then, whether those symptoms, the symptoms
she was having before the accident would have gone away without the
accident?
A: I can't say with a hundred percent certainty, no. (R. 363 at 172:11-25,
emphasis added).
60.

Dr. Petron did not testify at trial that Ms. Marshall's injuries were permanent

because of the motor vehicle accident. Dr. Petron did not testify that she needed future
medical care because of the accident. Dr. Petron did not testify that she had a permanent
impairment based on objective finding. Dr. Petron did define "objective" findings. (R. 363
at 137-173).
DR. JOEL PALL'S TESTIMONY THAT SUPPORTED VERDICT
61.

At trial, Dr. Dall testified:

Q: Do you anticipate as to whether or not she will have future medical
expenses in connection with this?
A: I would expect they would be similar to what they've been over the last
four years.
Plaintiffs counsel never qualified the term "this". He did not indicate whether "this" was
the auto accident or the 3 work injuries or a combination of them. (R. 364 at 190:1-9).
62.

At trial Dr. Dall testified:

Q : . . . I don't know that I asked, was that the motor vehicle accident that she
was in?
A: She discussed both injuries with me, one was work related, and then there
was a motor vehicle accident.
Q: And would these kinds of residual problems be consistent and be often the
results of such kinds of accidents and injuries?
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A: Yes.
Plaintiffs counsel did not distinguish whether "these kinds of residual problems" were
related to the auto accident or to work injuries. (R. 364 at 190:14-21).
63.

On direct examination, Dr. Dall testified:

Q: Where would they [trigger point injections] fit in terms of indication of
whether someone is really sick or not sick, or ready to go back to work?
A: That a tough questions, because different people use those to perform those
for considerably variable circumstances. And so I don't know, I mean it
would be an indication to me that a person was still symptomatic.
Obviously there'd be no reason to intervene if they weren't symptomatic. But
how severe it was, again, would be best left up to the performing physician.
(R. 364 at 192:25; 193:1-9, emphasis added).
64.

Dr. Dall was not aware that Plaintiff had treated with Dr. Travis Buzzard from

February, 1998 through May, 1998. (R. 364 at 198:10)
65.

While Dr. Dall was aware that Plaintiff had undergone some therapy before

Dr. Petron took over care, he did not know the specifics. (R. 364 at 198:14-15, 19)
66.

Dr. Dall was not aware that Ms. Marshall had 20 to 22 P.T. visits between

June, 1998 and September 8, 1998. (R. 364 at 198:24).
67.

Dr. Dall's testimony that Ms. Marshall was "continually improving" after the

first work incident was based on Dr. Petron's notes and records. (R. 364 at 199:4-5).
68.

Dr. Dall was not aware that Ms. Marshall filled a prescription for Lortab on

9/14/98. (R. 364 at 201:24).
69.

Dr. Dall was not aware that Ms. Marshall filled a prescription for

cyclobenzaprine on 9/2/98. (R. 364 at 202:5).
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70.

Dr. Dall had no recollection that Dr. Petron had written a prescription for more

therapy on 9/1/98. (R. 364 at 202:10).
71.

Dr. Dall has not seen or treated Plaintiff since 6/3/03 (R. 364 at 208:7).

72.

Dr. Dall testified:

Q:. . . If she is going to need care in the future, one of the things that - if
we're trying to determine the cause of the need for that care in the future,
which is one of the questions in this case, you would agree that you have to
look at all of her injuries, would you not?
A: Yes.
Q: And all of those injuries would contribute to - all of those injuries would
contribute to this ongoing pain.
A: Yes.
Q: It's not just one isolated incident that would cause this patient in particular
to need care in the future, is it?
A: If again we're speaking in general terms, that's correct. If we're speaking
in very specific terms, i.e. Ms. Marshall, I really don't have the records that
I need to make that kind of statement. (R. 364 at 208:13-25; 209:1-2,
emphasis added).
73.

Dr. Dall did not testify at trial that Ms. Marshall's injuries were permanent

because of the motor vehicle accident. Dr. Dall did not assign Plaintiff an impairment rating
or an impairment based on an objective finding that was caused by this accident. Dr. Dall
did not define "objective" findings. (R. 364 at 182-214).
JUDGE OUINN'S FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS
74.
During the hearing on the motion for new trial, Judge Quinn stated:
I think that what the jury did in this case was exactly what Dr. Chung
suggested, at least one of his two suggestions. They took the first one, which
is simply to treat this injury as an exacerbation of the pre-existing condition
of the last [inaudible] and the jury seemed to me that they employed that and
cut off the damages right at the point where Dr. Chung suggested they be cut
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off [inaudible] and I think on that basis there was evidence at the trial to
support the verdict that the jury returned. (R. 365 at 1:16-24).
75.

Judge Quinn stated during that same hearing:

THE COURT: Well, what Dr. Chung said is that there were two ways you
could look at this. One is that you can look at it as a temporary exacerbation
[inaudible] and it's clear to me from the jury's verdict that that's the
alternative that they took. That's exactly what they awarded. Or he said, you
know, it doesn't really matter to me, you could also say that there are three
different events that caused this and this is how I would apportion fault. He
really gave them two alternatives and they took the first.(R. 365 4:22-25; 5:1-5).
76.

Judge Quinn stated:

THE COURT: I'm going to deny the motion for a new trial. In my judgment
this verdict came back right in the range that I anticipated. I don't think, I
wasn't surprised by this, in the sense that this was a lower amount than I
anticipated. It was right in the range where I anticipated. I think the verdict
was well supported by the evidence, by the [inaudible] and would have
returned a verdict in that, that same range, and so because of that I have a hard
time finding any evidence of prejudice in the case. [Inaudible] result I
[inaudible] was well supported by the evidence [inaudible]. . . (R. 365 at
19:20-25; 20:1-4).
LIABILITY TESTIMONY THAT SUPPORTED THE VERDICT
77.

Plaintiff was traveling south on State Street in the far right lane going south

going 40 m.p.h. (R. 363 at 75:8, 22; 76:5, 10).
78.

The traffic in the lanes to her Plaintiffs left were "[m]oving right along with

[her]", "cars on the left side had - was passing me." (R. 363 at 76:18, 22).
79.

Plaintiff was looking straight and didn't notice other cars slow prior to the

impact. (R. 363 at 77:3; 76:25).
80.

Mr. Pierce testified that traffic was backed up all the way from the light at
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6400 South State Street to this intersection, two blocks north of 6400 South. (R. 363 at
114:15-25; 115:2-5).
81.

Mr. Pierce testified that several vehicles formed a gap in traffic and allowed

him to pass in front of them and that he was just into the outermost lane (i.e. Plaintiffs lane)
when the accident occurred. (R. 363 at 115:10; 118:4-25).
82.

Mr. Pierce thought Plaintiff was traveling too fast for the traffic conditions.

The conditions to which he referred were the backed up traffic.(R. 363 at 121:1-11; 123:1-3).
83.

Officer Kasey Heaton testified that traffic on a Saturday afternoon at this

intersection was typically heavy. (R. 363 at 132:21).
84.

Officer Heaton testified that he thought it would be "very reasonable" for

traffic to back up all the way to 6200 South on a Saturday afternoon. (R. 363 at 133:13).
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
Plaintiff has not marshaled all evidence that supported the jury's verdict and Judge
Quinn's factual finding. The issue in the case was whether the auto accident caused a
temporary aggravation of a serious, symptomatic pre-existing condition. Plaintiff was
required to marshal "all" record evidence that supported the verdict/fact findings and then
show that, in spite of the evidence and after all of the evidence is viewed in a light most
favorable to Defendant, that the verdict was clearly erroneous. Plaintiff stated that the only
evidence that supported the finding of a "temporary" injury was Dr. Chung's testimony.
That argument ignores all of the testimony about her pre-existing treatment and injuries, the
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fact that she reported continual improvement in the months immediately after the accident,
the large gaps in her treatment, etc. Defendant requests that the appellate court dismiss all
challenges to the factual findings and the verdict on this basis alone.
Plaintiff cannot show that the verdict and Judge Quinn's factual findings are clearly
erroneous. Judge Quinn's conclusion that the auto accident did not cause a permanent
impairment, that there was no evidence of a permanent impairment based upon objective
finding, that there is no test for myofascial pain, and that Plaintiffs medical condition is
permanent, but not because of the auto accident were all supported by competent evidence.
In addition to the testimony of Dr. Chung, there was significant testimonial evidence and
documentary evidence that this accident, at best, only caused a temporary aggravation of a
pre-existing condition. Plaintiff has not met her burden of showing that the verdict and the
factual findings are against the clear weight of the evidence.
Plaintiff attempts to cast Judge Quinn's factual finding that there was "no permanent
impairment based upon objective finding" as a question of law to be reviewed for
correctness. However, this court does not need to address that question given that Judge
Quinn concluded that there was no causal link between the auto accident and an alleged
"permanent impairment". That conclusion is well supported by the testimony of Dr. Chung
and other testimonial and documentary evidence. Further, even if the term "objective
findings" can be interpreted as a matter of law, there was no evidence at trial that this
Plaintiff had "objective" findings. To the contrary, the evidence at trial was that both Dr.
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Chung and Dr. Petron believed that this Plaintiff did not have a permanent impairment based
upon objective findings related to this accident.

Finally, there was no testimony that

Plaintiff had a permanent "impairment"; she may have a permanent medical condition, but
there was no testimony that her condition resulted in any type of impairment or impairment
rating.
Judge Quinn did not abuse his discretion when he denied Plaintiff s motion for a new
trial on the grounds of inadequacy of damages. In order to prevail on this point, Plaintiff
must "clearly" demonstrate that the verdict and the factual findings bore "no proper relation"
to the claimed injury. She must show that once all of the evidence is viewed in a light most
favorable to Defendant that no reasonable person would have returned such a low verdict.
That showing cannot be made. All 8 members of the jury and Judge Quinn all agreed that
the award was appropriate and fair. There was significant evidence that this accident only
caused a temporary aggravation of a pre-existing condition.
Judge Quinn's refusal to give Plaintiff s proposed instructions 11,15, and 16 was not
error. Plaintiff has not shown (or attempted to show) "prejudicial error." The instructions
that were given, when viewed as a whole, properly instructed the jury on the law of the case.
The instructions did not disadvantage Plaintiff or her attorneys from making arguments that
she had "lifelong pain and suffering." Plaintiff cannot show that the outcome of this trial
would have been different if their instructions had been given. The trial court did not err in
refusing to give Plaintiffs instructions.
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ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF HAS NOT MARSHALED "ALL" EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE
CHALLENGED FACTUAL FINDING(S)
Plaintiff did not enumerate the specific factual fmding(s) she now challenges. She

simply stated that "[t]he main issue in this case is whether plaintiff s injuries were permanent
or only temporary." (See Appellant's Brief at 1 & 8). It is not clear whether Plaintiff
challenges the jury's verdict and/or one or more of Judge Quinn's findings.
Rule 24(a)(9) reads in part: "A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all
record evidence that supports the challenged findings." This suggests that Plaintiff must
first enumerate the "challenged findings". She did not enumerate the challenged findings.
"[F]ailure to marshal the evidence and demonstrate that the trial court's findings were
clearly erroneous in light of the evidence allows us to affirm the court's findings on that
basis alone." Wilson v. Fradan Mfg.. 54 P.3d 1177, 1184 (Utah 2002)(citation omitted).
After marshaling all evidence supporting the findings, "an appellant must demonstrate that
even in the light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence was insufficient to support
the findings." Utah Medical Products. Inc v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 232 (Utah 1998)
(citations omitted). An appellate court applies " . . . this deferential standard to trial courts
because of their advantaged position to evaluate the evidence and determine the facts." Id.
(citations omitted). "If the challenger fails to meet this burden, its claim must fail." Id,
(citations omitted). Defendant requests that this Court summarily dismiss all challenges to
factual findings for failure to marshal "all" evidence.
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Plaintiff stated "[t]he only testimony that plaintiffs injuries from the automobile
collision were temporary came from Dr. Chung." (PI. 's Memo, at 14). That is not true. The
issue in this case was not whether Plaintiffs condition is "permanent" or "temporary";
rather, the issue was whether the accident related injuries were temporary or permanent.
Plaintiff did not marshal all record evidence supporting the verdict and the trial court's
findings. Some of that evidence -not cited by Plaintiff- is found below:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Plaintiff had 2 work related injuries to her back in the 8-9 months before this auto
accident.
She had continuous medical care from January, 1998 until the auto accident.
She had a diagnosis of myofascial pain syndrome before this auto accident.
Dr. Petron wrote a prescription for more therapy on 9/1/98, 3 weeks before the auto
accident.
She filled a prescription for Flexeril and Lortab within days of the auto accident.
Dr. Dall testified that if she was having trigger point injection, she was still
symptomatic
She had a series of trigger point injections on 9/10/98.
Dr. Petron testified that trigger point injections break muscle spasm and alleviate
pain. This suggests that she was, in fact, symptomatic on 9/10/98.
On 9/10/98 she was "quite tender" and she requested more injections.
She showed continual improvement between the time of the auto accident until
12/17/98.
On December 17, 1998, Dr. Petron discharged her; told her to return as needed or
PRN.
The medical expenses between the auto accident and 12/17/1998 totaled
approx.$2,100.
There was a 4 month gap between 12/17/1998 and April, 1999 in which she had no
care.
She injured her back a 3rd time at work in May, 1999.
She had no further care in 1999 after May, 1999.
She denied or could not remember the third work injury in May, 1999.
She had no treatment at all in 2001 and 2002.
She works as a certified nurses assistant and has had significantly more work related
injury and treatment than auto accident related treatment and care.
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All of these facts support the verdict and the trial court's findings. The defense
theory of this case was that the motor vehicle accident caused only a temporary aggravation
of a severe, symptomatic, and pre-existing condition. Plaintiff did not marshal the evidence
cited above, all of which supported the verdict.

The appellate court should dismiss all

challenges Plaintiff makes to the factual findings "on [this] basis alone."
II.

THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE JURY'S
VERDICT AND JUDGE QUINN'S FACTUAL FINDINGS THAT THE AUTO
ACCIDENT ONLY CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO SUFFER A TEMPORARY
EXACERBATION OF A SYMPTOMATIC PRE-EXISTING CONDITION
Plaintiff did not clarify whether she is challenging the jury's verdict or whether she

is only challenging the trial court's factual findings. Defendant will address both.
a.

Jury Verdict
Plaintiff stated: " . . . a careful consideration of the evidence in this action

demonstrates that the clear weight of the evidence is that Plaintiffs injuries from the auto
collision were permanent." (Appellant's Brief at 33). The verdict of a jury must stand
unless "the evidence so clearly preponderates in favor of the appellant that reasonable people
would not differ on the outcome of the case." E.A. Strout Western Realty v. W.C. Foy &
Sons. 665 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1983), Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468, 475 (Utah App.
1993). Plaintiff cannot show that "reasonable minds would not differ" on the outcome of
the case because, in fact, at least 9 reasonable "minds" (i.e. the jury and the judge) concluded
that her auto accident related injuries were temporary.
"When reviewing jury verdicts, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
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findings of the jury and uphold the verdict so long as there is competent evidence to sustain
it." Rees v. Intermountain Healthcare Inc.. 808 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1991). In this case,
there is significant "competent" evidence supporting the jury verdict. The jury made several
findings. First, the jury found that only $2,100 of her medical expenses was accident
related. That sum represents the amount of her medical special damages between the time
of the motor vehicle accident and 12/17/98. Further, Dr. Chung testified at trial and in his
reports that her accident related treatment period was between the date of the accident and
12/17/98. Thus, there is competent evidence to support the award of $2,100.
The jury declined to award future special damages. This, too, is supported by
competent evidence. Dr. Chung did not think any of future care would be necessary because
of the auto accident. Dr. Dall testified that he would apportion the need for future care
between the accident and the work injuries, but he did not have all of the records necessary
to apportion future medical care between those events. (R. 364 at 208:13-25; 209:1-2). This
aspect of the jury's verdict is supported by competent evidence.
The jury concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to general damages in the amount of
$2,200. The evidence supporting the general damages is ample. Certainly the jury
considered this plaintiffs treatment history in the 9 months before to the auto accident.
They considered that she filled a prescription for Lortab 4 days before the accident. They
considered the veracity of Plaintiff s testimony that she was "asymptomatic" prior to the auto
accident and compared her testimony to the other evidence. They weighed the gaps in her
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treatment and Plaintiffs testimony that, notwithstanding the gaps, all of her problems
resulted from this one auto accident. There was sufficient evidence for this jury to consider
when weighing and assessing "fair" and "just" general damages. The jury and the judge
agreed that this figure was appropriate based on the evidence. (R. at 349, f 1).
b.

Trial Court's Factual Findings
It appears to be Plaintiffs position that Judge Quinn's findings were against the

"clear weight of the evidence." (Appellant's Brief at 14). The judgment of no cause of
action was entered on the basis that Plaintiff did not satisfy any of the threshold requirements
of Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(l)(a). This section requires that Plaintiff prove she
sustained: (i) death, (ii) disfigurement, (iii) permanent disability or permanent impairment
based upon objective finding, (iv) permanent disfigurement, or (v) medical expenses in
excess of $3,000. She did not have $3,000 in medical expenses because the jury awarded
her $2,100 in accident related expenses. The only remaining criteria was subsection (iii) (i.e
"permanent impairment based upon objective finding").
In part, the trial court granted the judgment of no cause of action because there was
no evidence at trial that Plaintiff had a "permanent impairment based on objective finding",
let alone one caused by this auto accident. Judge Quinn concluded that "[t]he auto accident
did not cause a permanent impairment."

(R. at 349, ^ 2, italics added). A careful

examination of the evidence from Plaintiffs treating physicians (i.e. Drs. Dall & Petron)
reveals that Plaintiff did not ask either physician whether she had a permanent impairment,
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let alone one based upon objective finding, let alone one that was caused by this accident.
(R. 363 at 137-173; R. 364 at 182-213). Plaintiff did not ask her doctors to define
"objective" findings. There was no evidence that she had a "permanent impairment based
upon objective finding." There was no evidence that there was a "permanent impairment
based upon objective finding" that was caused by this accident.
Dr. Chung, on the other hand, did address the issue of "objective" findings. He was
the only physician at trial to address this topic. Dr. Chung testified that she had no objective
findings. (R. 364 at 4-17). He testified that there was no objective test for myofascial pain.
(R. 364 at 245:22-24). If there was no "objective" findings (and this was the only evidence
on this issue) then she necessarily did not prove that she had a "permanent impairment based
upon objective findings." As an aside, Dr. Petron, in Plaintiff s Ex.2, stated " [plaintiff] has
not sustained any permanent disability as far as loss of range of motion or any objective
impairment or disfigurement that we can see on MRI or x-ray. . ."
In sum, the "clear weight" of the evidence supported the trial court's factual finding
that Plaintiffs injuries were not "permanent because of the auto accident", that Plaintiffs
condition was "permanent before the auto accident," that there was no "permanent
impairment based upon objective finding."
c.

Response to Misc. Arguments in Section I of Appellant's Brief
Plaintiff stated that "Dr. Chung never mentions this alternative theory in his written

report (Ex. C). Had he stated in his oral testimony that he had changed his mind and now
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felt that the auto collision had only resulted in a temporary flare-up, that would be a medical
opinion, although perhaps a weak one." (Appellant's Brief at 21). Plaintiff did not preserve
this objection at trial and is barred from raising it on appeal. See Rule 103(1)(1), Utah Rules
ofEvidence: See e.g. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d29 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814,110
S.Ct. 62, 107 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989) (subdivision (a) requires a clear and definite objection at
trial to preserve an evidentiary error on appeal).
Dr. Chung's pre-trial report does, in fact, contain both "alternate" theories. He stated
on page 13 that "Ms. Marshall most likely achieved medical stability following the accident
of 9-18-98 on 12-17-98." He also stated that the jury could apportion the injuries between
the various injury events on an "equal" or near equal basis. (R. Def.'s Ex. C).
Plaintiff spent considerable time arguing that Dr. Chung's opinions are "totally
incompatible". (Appellant's Brief at 20-22). Whether Dr. Chung's opinions are "totally
incompatible" is a fact question for the jury to decide. See e.g. Weber Basin Water
Conservancy Dist. v. Skeen, 328 P.2d 730,731 (Utah 1938)(" ... it is within the prerogative
of the jury to believe whom it chooses . . .When a jury verdict is supported by competent
evidence, as was here the case, it is generally left unaltered by the court."). Whether the
opinions of Dr. Chung were "incompatible" was a question that dealt with the weight of his
testimony, a question reserved exclusively for the jury.
Plaintiff did not object at trial to Dr. Chung's opinions and waived all arguments with
respecttothe admissibility those opinions. See Rule 103(1 )(1), Utah Rules ofEvidence; See
e.g. State v. Eldredge, supra. Plaintiff has not preserved a right to appeal the scope of Dr.
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Chung's trial testimony.
III.

THE COURT'S FACTUAL FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO OBJECTIVE
EVIDENCE OF PERMANENT INJURIES FROM THE MOTOR VEHICLE
ACCIDENT WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
The issue below was whether Plaintiff had shown she had sustained permanent

injuries in the accident based upon objective findings—the showing Plaintiff needed to meet
the threshold requirements of UCA § 31 A-22-309(l)(a). Plaintiff failed to submit the issue
of permanent injury to the jury, and when the jury awarded less than $3000 in medical
expenses, Plaintiff was faced with the prospect of losing the entire damage award. Following
the trial when that became apparent Plaintiff argued that under URCP Rule 49(a), the trial
judge could make the factual finding regarding whether Plaintiff had a permanent impairment
based upon objective finding. (R. 365 at 7:16-21).
At Plaintiff s request, the judge did make additional findings of fact and those findings
were unfavorable to Plaintiff One of those findings is now challenged by Plaintiff as being
a legal conclusion rather than a finding of fact. The correct standard of review, however, is
abuse of discretion because the challenged finding was "factual".
While Plaintiff singles out one fact, the court actually made several factual findings,
any one of which alone could be sufficient to prevent Plaintiff from meeting threshold.
Plaintiff focuses on the finding that "[t]here is no objective test for myofascial pain." Even
assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court was mistaken in such a finding, finding
number two still bars recovery. The judge found that "[t]he auto accident did not cause a
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permanent impairment." Even if Plaintiff s self reports of pain, disbelieved by both judge
and jury, had been sufficient to establish "permanent impairment," the finding of the trial
court is clear that such impairment was not caused by the auto accident. The court's fourth
finding likewise goes to causation, "The Court is convinced that Plaintiffs condition is
permanent but is also convinced that it is not permanent because of the auto accident. The
condition was permanent before the auto accident." The trial court's conclusions on
causation are specific to this case and set of facts. They are factual findings that are reviewed
on a "clearly erroneous" standard. If they are upheld, there is no need to get to the finding
that there is no objective test for myofascial pain.
Notwithstanding, the trial court's finding that there is no objective test for myofascial
pain is a factual finding based on the testimony of Dr. Chung. Such a finding could change
tomorrow if an expert were to present evidence of a test for myofascial pain not based on the
patient's subjective reports of pain. As the finding was based on evidence before the trial
court, it is not a conclusion of law and the "clearly erroneous" standard of review applies.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant waived its defense on permanent impairment based on
lack of motion for directed verdict below.1 Since Defendant prevailed below, there was no
need to move for a directed verdict. Defendant is merely seeking to uphold the findings of
the trial court and jury and Plaintiffs cited case of Henderson v. Meven 533 P.2d 290 (Utah

defendant did, in fact, move for a directed verdict once the jury had been
dismissed. (R. 364 at 308-09).
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1975) is inapposite.
Plaintiff seeks to shift her burden of proof by arguing that Defendant bore the burden
of submitting the question of permanent impairment to the jury. Section 31A-22-309,
however, by its plain language places the burden on Plaintiff.
A person [i.e. plaintiff or the one maintaining the action] who has or is
required to have direct benefit coverage under a policy which includes
personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of action for general
damages arising out of personal injuries alleged automobile accident, except
where the person has sustained one or more of the following:
* * *

(iii) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective
findings;
31 A-22-309(l)(a) (cited in part). The Utah Court of Appeals placed the burden of showing
permanency on the plaintiff, Ms. McNair, in McNair v. Farris, 944 P.2d 392,395 (Utah App.
1997) (". . McNair [plaintiff] thus has the burden of demonstrating the permanency of his
injury with something more than his say so.M).
Plaintiff concedes (Appellant's Brief at 37) that "[t]he court makes clear in McNair
that the testimony of a physician is required,..." but Plaintiff did not elicit testimony from
her experts regarding objective findings. (R. 363 at 137-173; 364 at 182-213). Only Exhibit
C (i.e. Dr. Petron's records) mentions the term, but it states that Plaintiff had no impairment
based on objective findings.

Additionally, no one testified at trial that she had an

"impairment" or that one was caused by this accident. (R. 363 at 137-173; 364 at 182-213).
The one example Plaintiff cites of her doctor's "objective" test is Dr. Dall's record of
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March 25, 2003. Plaintiff highlights the language,
Her response to palpation within this area is dramatic (she's constantly batting
my hand away) and as soon as I move our [sic] of this area she has no other
tenderness. She is not tender to light touch and pressure applied with my palm
is much better tolerated than with a fingertip.
Plaintiff states that this "clearly meets" the 1936 Louisiana test of "expressions of pain
clearly involuntary." However, batting a hand away is not "intuitively subjective." Dr.
Chung testified that if the patient can influence the response, it is a "subjective" finding.
Thus, this example does not fall in the same category as pallor or nausea, because the action
of batting away a hand can be controlled by the patient..
Plaintiffs citations to a 1910 Missouri case, a 1923 Nebraska case, a 1936 Louisiana
case, and a 2002 Oregon case are not particularly helpful in ascertaining the Utah State
Legislature's intent in using the phrase "objective findings." Simply reading the threshold
statute according the plain meaning of its words, it is clear that the trial court's findings of
fact were based on evidence at trial. The trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
PLAINTIFF'SMOTIONFORANEWTRIALBASEDONPLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
OF INADEQUACY OF DAMAGES
Plaintiff raises two arguments based on inadequacy of damages. (1) That the special

damages were inadequate based on passion or prejudice. (2) The general damage award was
inadequate based on passion or prejudice. These arguments are addressed below.
From Appellant's brief, it is unclear which standard of review she would have the
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appellate court employ. First, she argues that the correct standard of review is abuse of
discretion (Appellant's Brief at 2 and 3). However, she later argues that the trial court's
denial of the motion for new trial "should be reviewed for correctness." (Appellant's Brief
at 41). The correct standard of review for a trial court's denial of a motion for new trial
based on inadequate damages is abuse of discretion. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc.. 82 P.3d
1064, 1070 (Utah 2003); Chatelain v. Thackeray. 100 P.2d 191, 198 (Utah 1940).
The appellate court should be "slow to interfere with a ruling granting or refusing a
new trial on questions relating to damages" because "[g]ranting or refusing a new trial on
these grounds [i.e. inadequacy of damages] of necessity largely rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court." Id., at 197, 198 (citation omitted). "[I]t is seldom that the
amount of the verdict standing alone is so inadequate or excessive as to indicate passion or
prejudice." Saltas v. Affleck, 105 P.2d 176, 178 (Utah 1940). The appellate court "will
reverse only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision." Smith at 1070. "[I]n
interfering it should be made to appear that the jury plainly disregarded or misconceived the
instruction or the evidence, or acted under the influence of passion or prejudice." Id, at 197.
See also Wellman v. Noble, 366 P.2d 701 (Utah 1961) (reversed on other grounds in Randle
v.Allen. 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993)) (Plaintiff s burden is to show that the jury "had clearly
been mistaken or misconceived the facts or the law on the amount of damages, or that the
verdict was a result of passion or prejudice."); Chatelain at 198, (". . .when the amount
assessed by a jury bears no proper relation to the wrong suffered as shown by the evidence
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and in accordance with the instructions of the court, then a proper case is presented for the
exercise by the court of its power to set aside verdicts.")
A.

The Award of Special Damages was Supported by the Evidence
Plaintiff argues that the special and general damages awarded by the jury were so low

that the only conclusion that can be reached by the verdict is that they the jury acted out of
passion or prejudice. (Appellant's Brief at 40-44). Plaintiff cannot show that the special
damage award of the jury "bears no proper relation" to the injury or that there was no
"reasonable basis" for the award because the verdict was supported by the evidence.
The issue at trial was whether the accident related condition was a temporary
aggravation of a pre-existing condition. Defendant argued that the appropriate amount of
special damages was roughly $2,100. That figure represents the total of the medical bills
between the date of the auto accident and 12/17/98 - i.e. the date assigned by Dr. Chung to
the accident related expenses. This is a reasonable basis for the special damage award.
Defendant introduced Defense Exhibit E which was a summary of Plaintiff s medical
treatment (at least through 1999). It was clear that Plaintiff had an ongoing and severe preexisting condition for which she was constantly under doctor's care for 9 months. It was
clear from that her treatment following the auto accident lasted for three more months before
a rather large gap in treatment. It was undisputed that Plaintiff re-injured her back for the
3rd time in May, 1999. These are reasonable bases for the jury to conclude that the accident
related treatment only lasted until December, 1998.
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In addition, Plaintiffs trial testimony was unconvincing and in contrast with much
of the evidence. The jury weighed Plaintiffs credibility when deciding whether her accident
related special damages were $2,100 or, in the alternative, $6,300. Plaintiff testified that she
was asymptomatic before the auto accident and related all of her ongoing problems to the
auto accident. In contrast, Exhibit E showed ongoing care until the date of the accident.
There were records showing that days before the accident she filled prescriptions. She
reported to Dr. Petron on 9/10/98 that she was "quite tender" and she requested trigger point
injections. In that same record, it was noted that her care providers were concerned about
her "dependence" on physical therapy. There were records from her physical therapist in
early September, 1998 that she was still symptomatic and only had "slight" improvement.
There were the records from Dr. Petron in 1998 after the auto accident that showed continual
improvement. All of this evidence contrasted Plaintiffs claim that all of her current
symptoms were related to the auto accident. These are "reasonable bases" for a jury to
conclude that she suffered a temporary aggravation of a pre-existing condition.
"The amount of damages in a jury case is (generally) a matter that is within the
peculiar province of the jury." Chatelain at 198. The jury was presented with testimony
from at least three medical doctors, countless medical records, and summaries of medical
records. The judge and jury saw and heard the witnesses. The jury heard the arguments of
counsel, including the pleas to award significant damages. After hearing evidence and after
weighing the credibility of the witnesses and the documentary evidence, the jury deliberated
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for several hours and returned a verdict. The trial Judge agreed with the jury and so stated
to Plaintiffs counsel in the hearing on the motion for a new trial. In fact, Judge Quinn
stated that if he had been deciding the case he would have returned a verdict in that dollar
range. Thus, the judge and the 8 jury members all agreed that the damages were proper.
Plaintiff argued that because she accrued $6,305.37 in medical expenses that the
special damage award of $2,100 was "contrary" to the evidence. (Appellant's Brief at 4445). The parties stipulated before trial that Plaintiff accrued expenses following the
accident, but did not agree that those expenses were accident related. Dr. Chung's pre-trial
report (R. Def.'s Ex. C at 13) stated that "Ms. Marshall most likely achieved medical
stability following the accident of 9-18-98 on 12-17-98." Dr. Chung testified that the only
accident treatment she had was between 9/22/98 and 12/17/98. (R. 364 at 234:5-7; 241:16).
Thus, while the parties agreed that Plaintiffs bills totaled $6,30.37, the parties never agreed
that all of those expenses were accident related. The question about what expenses were
related was submitted to the jury.
Plaintiff argues that the jury's failure to award future special damages was evidence
that they misunderstood the instructions and/or misapplied them. Plaintiff states that "[t]here
was no evidence to the contrary" but that she would require future medical care related to
this accident. (Appellant's Brief at 45). That is not true. The need for accident related
future care was disputed. Dr. Chung testified that "I don't think further care is not - 1 don't
think further care is necessary." (R. 364 at 239:10-14). While Dr. Dall did testify that she
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would need future care, he was not prepared to offer opinions about how the work injuries
contributed to the need for that care. (R. 364 at 208:13-25; 209:1-2). The issue given to the
jury was whether she was entitled to any accident related future care. The doctors disagreed
Plaintiff argued that the Court failed to give a Tingey v. Christensen. 987 P.2d 588
(Utah 1999) instruction. (Appellant's Brief at 45-46). Plaintiff admittedly did not request
such an instruction prior to trial and waived any claimed defect as a result.2 Plaintiff admits
that even though she did not request this instruction, the Court should find, as a matter of
law, that there was no reasonable basis for apportionment under the standard set forth in
Tingey. Plaintiff waived all arguments relative to Tingey v. Christensen.
Whether a reasonable basis existed for apportionment is a determination best made
by the trial court. There was sufficient evidence at trial to support an apportionment of
damages. The assertion that there was no "reasonable basis for apportionment" has no merit.
Plaintiff computed some figures on pages 46 and 47 of Appellant's Brief to assert that
additional medical expenses should have been awarded. Damages were given to the jury
and they did not to accept Plaintiffs theory. Even if these arguments are acceptable on
appeal, they do not show that Judge Quinn abused his discretion. Judge Quinn did not

2

"[T]o assert that the trial court erred in either giving or failing to give an
instruction, a party must first submit correct instructions and, then, should the court fail
to give them, timely except." In re C.Y. v. Yates, 765 P.2d 251, 254 (Utah Ct.App.1988)
(citation omitted). "[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on
that issue." Brookside Mobile Home Park. Ltd. v. Peebles. 48 P.3d 968 (Utah 2002)
(citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)).
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believe that care beyond the December, 1998 date was accident related. The appellate court
should give deference to Judge Quinn and his determination that the jury did not act out of
prejudice or passion.
In sum, the appellate court should not upset the verdict. Plaintiff has not shown an
"abuse of discretion." There were reasonable bases for the award of special damages and
the refusal to award future special damages. Plaintiff did not and cannot show that the
damage award bore "no proper relation" to the claimed injury.
B.

The General Damage Award was Reasonable
Plaintiff argues that no reasonable person could conclude that $2,200 in general

damages was sufficient to compensate her for general damages and that the trial court
abused its discretion. (Appellant's Brief at 40-44). However, at least 9 reasonable people
(i.e the judge and the jury) agreed that the damage award was fair and adequate.
Plaintiffs argument is flawed. First, other reasonable conclusions can be reached
about the jury's verdict. One conclusion is that the jury chose to believe the defense theory.
Plaintiff argued that the jury should award her for "lifelong" pain and suffering. The jury
refused to do that. The jury was in the best position to hear and see all evidence.
In Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Skeen, 328 P.2d 730 (Utah 1938), the
Utah Supreme Court was faced with a situation in which three different expert opinions were
offered at a jury trial as to the value of land in a condemnation case. Id, at 731. The
plaintiff called two experts who testified that the land was worth between $45,000 and
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$50,000; however, the defendant's expert testified that the land was worth $80,000. Id.The
verdict was $80,000 for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed. Id The Court stated:
The jury had the benefit of opinions from three qualified experts as to the
value of the land. Although these opinions varied considerably it is within the
prerogative of the jury to believe whom it chooses, and it chose to believe to
believe defendant's expert rather than plaintiffs. . .When a jury verdict is
supported by competent evidence, as was here the case, it is generally left '
unaltered by the court. In this case the alleged passion and prejudice has not
been demonstrated. . . The fact that the jury chose to render its verdict in
harmony with the highest of the available valuations is not in itself cause for
reversal. Id.
The present case is similar to the Skeen case in that the jury verdict was "supported by
competent evidence." Because the jury believed the defense theory is not cause for reversal.
Plaintiff requested future special damages, but the jury did not award them. This was
likely based on the theory that her accident related injury only lasted a few months, or until
12/17/1998. Dr. Chung testified, on more than one occasion, that even if she was not
involved in this accident, she would have exacerbations of her condition. Dr. Chung
testified that no future care was necessary because of this auto accident. The jury believed
Dr. Chung on this point. The fact that they awarded $0 in future special damages supports
the conclusion that the jury did not believe that the accident caused any "permanent" injury
or "permanent" pain and suffering.
Plaintiff cited several cases to support her argument that the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to allow a new trial based on inadequate damages. First, she cited
Saltas v. Affleck, 105 P.2d 176 (Utah 1940). (Appellant's Brief at 42-43). In Saltas the
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Utah Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the trial court's grant of a new trial was
an abuse of discretion. Id., at 177. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. Id. at
178. The Utah Supreme Court gave significant deference to the trial court:
[d]amages in the sum of $800 may have seemed sufficiently inadequate as to
cause the court to think the verdict was the result of bias or prejudice.
Whether such bias or prejudice existed we have no means of determining
except from the amount of the verdict." Id,
The Court stated " . . . the amount of the verdict is a matter exclusively for the jury." Id,
The Saltas case is factually distinguishable from the case at bar. In Saltas, the trial
court did, in fact, grant a new trial. Id. The trial court determined that $800 in damages for
the death of a 30 year father was not sufficient. Id, In the present case, Plaintiff suffered
from a temporary aggravation of a pre-existing back injury. It is not reasonable to compare
the verdicts in the two cases.
In Saltas it was determined that the jury did not understand or disregarded the
evidence and/or the law because of the inordinately low verdict; there was no other
explanation for the low verdict. However, in this case the damage award was supported by
the evidence and there is no reason to disturb the verdict on appeal.
Plaintiff cited Chatelain v. Thackeray. 100 P.2d 191, 198 (Utah 1940). Plaintiffs
reliance on that case is misguided. That case involved such different injuries and damages
that it should not be compared to the case at bar. That was a wrongful death case and the jury
awarded minimal damages to the plaintiff for the death of a spouse. Id, The trial court
granted a new trial based on inadequacy of damages and the question on appeal was whether
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the grant of that motion was an abuse of discretion. IdL at 198. The Utah Supreme Court
gave discretion to the trial court to make the determination whether the evidence supported
the award. In Chatelain the defendant argued that the Hirabelli v. Daniels, 44 Utah 88,138 P.
1172 (Utah 1914) case was "conclusive". The Court stated:
[w]e do not think that the Hirabelli case is necessarily decisive of the instant
case. Both the facts and the proceedings of the court in connection therewith
are different, and in applying the principles laid down in the Hirabelli case a
different result might properly be reached. Chatelain at 198.
In other words, each case is unique and the principles in Hirabelli and Chatelain are applied
to individual cases to reach different results. Applying the principles set forth above, there
is no evidence that the trial court abused its discretion.
Plaintiff cited Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch, 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993). (Appellant's
Brief at 43-44). Defendant agrees that the trial court is in the best position to make the
determination whether to grant or deny a motion for new trial. Defendant agrees the trial
judge is better situated to make this determination because he/she is present during all
aspects of the trial and is therefore better able to determine whether the jury acted out of
passion or prejudice. Judge Quinn acted within his discretion and concluded that the jury
did not act out of passion or prejudice. That conclusion should not be disturbed on appeal.
Plaintiff stated that "[i]t appears clear that they did not understand the instructions on
damages." (Appellant's Brief at 43). Plaintiff points to a question the jury returned asking
the Court to define past special damages, future special damages, and general damages. The
Court referred the jury to instructions 28 and 29. (R. 364 at 306-07). That direction was
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given, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict. The jury did not ask additional questions.
Plaintiff did not poll the jury nor did she request that they continue to deliberate. From this,
it is a stretch to conclude that the jury misunderstand the instructions.
Plaintiff stated that "[i]n any event they certainly did not follow them [the instructions
on damages], and did not award reasonable damages. The jury did not award an amount that
any reasonable person could claim for a lifetime of pain and suffering, nor even 30% of such
an amount." (Appellant's Brief at 43). Plaintiff did not demonstrate how the jury did not
follow those instructions, nor did she demonstrate which instructions were not followed.
Plaintiffs conclusion that the damage award was not "reasonable" is without foundation or
support. What is reasonable for this injury given these facts? That question is reserved for
the jury. See e.g. Chaetlain at 198 ("The amount of damages in a jury case is (generally) a
matter that is within the peculiar province of the jury."). Plaintiff stated that the damage
award is not reasonable to compensate someone for a "lifetime of pain and suffering".
Plaintiffs opportunity to make this argument ceased when the cases was given to the jury.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING PLAINTIFF PROPOSED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 11,15 and 16
"A trial court's ruling concerning jury instruction is reviewed for correctness."

Paulos v. Covenant Transport, Inc., 86 P.3d 752, 754 (Utah App. 2004) (citing Butler v.
Naylor, 987 P.2d 41 (Utah 1999)). However, "[a] new trial will not be granted unless any
error of the trial court was prejudicial, meaning that it misadvised or misled the jury on the
law." Id. The appellate court will only find prejudicial error after a review of the record
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demonstrates that "there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
[appellant]." In re C.Y. v. Yates. 765 P.2d 251, 254 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (citing State v.
Knight 734 P.2d 913,919 (Utah 1987) (other citations omitted). "A reasonable likelihood
is ?a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" Id. (citing Knight 734
P.2d at 920, other citations omitted). "Jury instructions are examined in their entirety, thus
we 'will affirm when the instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the case."5 Id. (citing Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande, 31 P.3d 557 (Utah 2001)).
a.

Plaintiffs Proposed Instruction was Properly Denied
Plaintiffs proposed Instruction No. 16 was partially authored by Plaintiffs counsel.

When presented to the Court, it was submitted without legal authority. (R. at 129).
Essentially, Plaintiff s counsel took MUJI 5.17 and added her own, argumentative language
in the second paragraph. The failure to give this instruction did not result in prejudice
because Plaintiff argued the points proposed in the instruction in closing argument.
Moreover, the first paragraph of that instruction properly gave the jury the
appropriate legal standard to apply for left turning vehicles. Instruction No. 15 instructed
them about general principles of negligence. Instruction No. 16 instructed them that
Plaintiff could assume that Mr. Pierce would operate his vehicle in accordance with safety
laws. Instruction No. 17 told the jury that Mr. Pierce had a duty to make reasonable
observations. All of these instructions, when taken together, properly instructed the jury.
Ultimately the jury concluded that the defendant was 90% at fault for causing this
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collision and that Plaintiff was only 10%. Defendant all but conceded liability, but asked
the jury to consider the relevant evidence. That evidence included the fact that Plaintiff was
going 40 m.p.h. at a time when she should have seen traffic in the other lanes slowing.
Plaintiff did not look to see if traffic was slowing in the lanes to her left. She testified that
her intent was to go straight through 6400 South in her lane even though that lane was not
a through lane. She was not paying attention to the general traffic conditions. This was
sufficient for a jury to conclude that she had 10% of the fault.
b.

Plaintiffs Requested Instruction No. 15 was Properly Denied
Plaintiff requested MUJI No. 27.7, but Judge Quinn refused that instruction. That

instruction deals with a plaintiff that has a "latent, dormant, or asymptomatic condition55 that
is "lit up55 by an accident. The evidence did not fit the instruction. Further, when the
instruction that was given is viewed in its entirety, along with the other instructions, Plaintiff
was not prejudiced. Plaintiff proposed the following instruction (MUJI 27.7):
A person who has a latent, dormant or asymptomatic condition, or a condition
to which the person is predisposed, may recover the full amount of damages
that proximately result from injuries that aggravate the condition. In other
words, when a latent condition does not cause pain, but that condition plus the
injury brings on pain by aggravating the preexisting, dormant or asymptomatic
condition, then it is the injury, not the dormant or asymptomatic condition,
that is the proximate cause of pain and disability.
According to this instruction, Plaintiff was only entitled to recovery only those damages that
"proximately resulted from injuries that aggravate the [dormant or asymptomatic]
condition.55 Further, this instruction tells the jury that it is "the injury, not the dormant or
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asymptomatic condition, that is the proximate cause of the pain and disability." When
compared to the instruction that was given, this instruction would not have resulted in a
different conclusion.
The instruction that was given reads:
A person who has a condition or disability at the time of an injury is not
entitled to recover damages for that condition or disability. However, the
injured person is entitled to recover damages for any aggravation of such
preexisting condition or disability proximately resulting from the injury.
This is true even if the person's condition or disability made the injured
person more susceptible to the possibility of ill-effects than a normally healthy
person would have been, and even if a normally healthy person probably
would not have suffered any substantial injury.
When a preexisting condition or disability is aggravated, damages for the
condition or disability are limited to the additional injury caused by the
aggravation.
This instruction tells the jury that Plaintiff is not "entitled to recover damages for that
[preexisting] condition or disability..." and that her damages are "limited to the additional
injury caused by the aggravation." That is substantially similar to MUJI 27.7 which tells
the jury that the injured person was only entitled to those damages that were "proximately"
caused by the aggravation. When read as a whole, the instruction allowed Plaintiff to argue
her theory of the case. In fact, she made those arguments.
Judge Quinn stated that nothing in the instruction he gave prevented the jury from
reaching the conclusion sought by Plaintiff.
[tjhere is certainly nothing in the way that the Court is instructing the jury that
prevents them from finding, should they find that the plaintiff was fully
recovered, that 11 of her current symptoms result from this accident. (R. 364
at 177:17-20).
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There is no analysis, or attempted analysis, in Plaintiffs Brief regarding "prejudicial
error". Plaintiff simply stated that "failure to give Plaintiffs Requested Instruction No. 15
was prejudicial error." There is no analysis of what "prejudice" she suffered. The bald
assertion that this error was "prejudicial" does not give the court any insight as to how the
verdict would have been different, how her arguments at trial would have been different, etc.
Plaintiff argued all of the points to the jury that she now raises on appeal. From Plaintiffs
Brief it is difficult to know what prejudice she suffered. The instruction that was given
sufficiently conveyed the theories of both cases and properly instructed the jury.
Moreover, in order for Plaintiffs proposed instruction to be proper ~ according to
the portions of Biswell v. Duncan. 742 P.2d 80 (Ut.App. 1987) cited by Plaintiff- she had
to show that the "latent condition itself does not cause pain". Id at 88, Appellant's Brief
at 49-50.

The overwhelming evidence was that her condition was not "latent",

"asymptomatic" and/or not "causing pain" even though that was her contention. Here is
some of the relevant evidence that suggested she was symptomatic at the time of the auto
accident:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

She filled a prescription for Lortab just 4 days before the accident.
She filled a prescription for a muscle relaxant, Flexeril, just weeks before the
accident.
She reported to her physician just 8 days before the accident - 9/10/98.
During this visit her physician reported that she was "quite tender" to palpation.
The trigger point inj ections would have masked any symptoms she was having on the
day of the auto accident.
In the 9/10/98 visit Dr. Petron noted that she was becoming "dependent" on physical
therapy.
Defendant's Exhibit E showed a continuous treatment pattern for 9 months prior to
45

•
•
•
•

•

the auto accident.
She had two prior work related injuries that required significant treatment.
Dr. Petron diagnosed her with myofascial pain syndrome prior to the accident.
Dr. Chung testified that it was unlikely that she would have been pain free in the days
and weeks prior to the auto accident.
Dr. Dall testified, on direct examination, that if she had trigger point injections that
would be an indication "to me that a person was still symptomatic." (R. 364 at 193:56). She had trigger point injections just days before the accident.
She was not a very credible witness - she related all of her current symptoms and
need for treatment on this one accident despite the fact that both Dr. Dall and Dr.
Chung testified that the other work incidents were also factors, she refused to take
any responsibility for causing the collision, she could not remember the dates of her
work injuries, she did not remember the May, 1999 work injury, etc.

So, while Plaintiff testified that she was "asymptomatic" prior to the accident, it was clear
that she was symptomatic, and that her condition was "patent", not "latent".
Plaintiff stated that Dr. Petron told her she was released to go back to work just two
days before the accident. However, there was no visit doctor two days before the accident,
nor was there any record of a telephone call or other note to indicate that Dr. Petron, in fact,
released to go back to work. Plaintiff is correct when she states that in the 9/10/98 record
Dr. Petron noted that she would return to "full duty shortly" and that at trial Dr. Petron
confirmed the contents of that record. What Plaintiff does not mention is that, on cross
examination, Dr. Petron conceded that there was nothing in the 9/10/98 record to support
Plaintiffs contention that she was released to go back to work. (R. 363 at 168:18-22).
Plaintiff correctly recited therapist Theresa Hall's record of 9/23/98. However, that
record does not state that she was released to full "duty", just full "time".
Plaintiff correctly recites Dr. Petron's record of 9/22/98 (i.e. that she was "doing
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well" until she was in the auto accident and then had some "increased pain again"). That
record does not say she was "asymptomatic," only that she was doing "well".
Plaintiff stated that "[furthermore, Dr. Petron testified that but for the accident she
would have fully recovered." (Appellant's Brief at 49). That is not what Dr. Petron said.
That exchange is as follows:
Q: But for that accident, do you have an opinion as to whether she would have
otherwise recovered? You indicated earlier nearly so and I'm just saying ...
A: Well, based on - on the record as I look back on 8/24/98, she was a hundred
percent better, and then she lifted a patient, she re-injured her back lifting the
patient, at that time it was thoracic back pain.
Q: Then on the 10th?
A: Then on the 10th, she's still having some thoracic back pain Q: But is improving (inaudible) five trigger points.
A: Correct.
Q: Isn't there some language in that visit that again suggests continuing
improvement.
A: Right. So she had - she had been 100% better up until the re-exacerbation,
and then continued improvement.
Q; And that - the complaint she had as of that time was primarily stiffness well, read it again, would you?
A: Where are you?
Q: The one o n A: On September 10th or on Q: No - the one - 8/24 where she - she . ..
A: Yeah, on 8/24 she was a hundred percent better until she lifted a patient and
had a re-injury at that point, and we put her on light duty for a couple of weeks,
some more physical therapy, but more of a lumbar and thoracic back strain.
And then on 9/10, she continues Q: And the last A: Pardon?
Q: In the last sentence of that, she is mainly just feeling stiffness, decreased
pain in her lower thoracic spine.
A: Right.. . . (R. 363 at 160:14-25; 161:1-20).
Dr. Petron said that she fully recovered before the second work injury (i.e. in August, 1998).
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On cross examination, he was asked again whether, "but for" the accident, she would have
fully recovered. He responded: "It's always hard to speculate if someone would be better.
.." (R. 363 at 172:9-16). Dr. Petron was equivocal and hesitant when asked this question.
These are responses that would have been apparent to the judge and the jury.
In conclusion, the Instruction No. 15 was properly given. It was consistent with the
facts of the case and, when compared to the instruction proposed by Plaintiff, it only allowed
the same measure of damages. Plaintiff has not demonstrated error, let alone prejudicial
error.
c.

The Court Properly Denied Plaintiffs Proposed Life Expectancy Instruction
Plaintiff proposed an instruction that would have told the jury that her life expectancy

was 25.3 years. Plaintiff asked Judge Quinn to take judicial notice of this mortality table.
No witness was called at trial to testify that Plaintiffs life expectancy was, in fact, 25.3
years. Judge Quinn refused to give this instruction because Plaintiff failed to prove,
according to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, that the source of the mortality table
was not "(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
capable or accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned." (R. 364 at 178-179). Judge Quinn determined that the mortality
tables were not within his general knowledge. He stated that because the accuracy of the
mortality tables were questioned by Mr. Pierce, the source of the mortality tables (i.e. Am
Jur 2nd Desk Book) was not the type of source whose "accuracy cannot reasonably be
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questioned."
Plaintiff failed to give Judge Quinn any other sources for mortality table information,
or any other information that the source was, in fact, reliable. Rule 201 states that the Court
"shall" take judicial notice of a fact when a party requesting judicial notice supplies the court
"with the necessary information." That was not done here and, as a result, Judge Quinn was
not required to take judicial notice of the mortality table.
Plaintiff stated: "[t]he applicable mortality table was furnished to the court from a
reliable and accepted source, to wit: Am Jur 2nd Desk Book." (Appellant's Brief at 48).
Plaintiff has missed the point. The issue for Judge Quinn was whether the Am Jur 2nd Desk
Book had been shown to be a "reliable" source and he determined that Plaintiff failed to
prove that. Plaintiff failed to prove that the source was, in fact, "reliable". The bald
assertion that it is "reliable" does not substantively address the reliability of the source.
There is nothing in the record to show that the Am Jur 2nd Desk Book is the type of source
whose "accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."
Plaintiff has not provided analysis regarding "prejudicial error". There is nothing in
her brief that suggests that the outcome of the case would have been different if this
instruction had been given. It is not enough for Plaintiff to simply assert a "prejudicial
error" without showing how she was prejudiced and why it was "prejudicial." She is
required to show "[a] reasonable likelihood" of a different outcome. A reasonable
likelihood is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Plaintiffs
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brief is devoid of this analysis.
Moreover, it is not material whether the mortality table was introduced into evidence
or judicially noticed because Plaintiff asked for future general and special damages and did
not get them. Plaintiffs counsel did, in fact, argue that Plaintiff should be entitled to general
damages and future special damages for a "lifetime of pain and suffering." Thus, with or
without the mortality table, the jury still considered whether the accident related injury
resulted in the need for "lifetime of pain and suffering." Whether they knew her life
expectancy or not really makes no difference. If there was an error, it was harmless.
CONCLUSION
Defendant requests that Plaintiffs appeal be dismissed on all grounds.
DATED this^Sday of December, 2004.
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & PAYNE,
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>Attq£p£ys for Defendant/Appellee
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